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NO ROOM FOR SQUATTERS: 
ALASKA’S ADVERSE POSSESSION 
LAW 
JENNIE MORAWETZ* 
ABSTRACT 
In 2003, the Alaska Legislature dramatically changed Alaska’s adverse 
possession law. Alaska’s new law curtails the application of adverse 
possession in a way that is more stringent than any other state’s law. This 
Note summarizes Alaska’s adverse possession law prior to 2003 and discusses 
how it was changed in 2003 by the passage of Senate Bill 93. The Note then 
explores some implications of the new law: the ability to extinguish but not 
create private easements by prescription, the importance of recording, and the 
potential for a “good faith squatter” to lose land she believes is hers. 
INTRODUCTION 
On April 16, 2003, the Alaska Senate Judiciary Committee met to 
discuss Senate Bill 93, the goal of which was to “repeal the Doctrine of 
Adverse Possession in the case of ‘bad faith’ trespassers, giving private 
property owner’s [sic] security in knowing their property cannot be 
taken by squatters.”1 The traditional doctrine of adverse possession 
allows adverse possessors to gain title to property possessed in a 
continuous, exclusive, open, notorious, and hostile manner2 for a certain 
 
* Duke University School of Law, J.D. and M.E.M. expected 2013; Stanford 
University, B.S. 2007. The author would like to thank Professor William A. 
Reppy, Jr. for his guidance throughout the research and writing process. 
 1.  Sponsor Statement for CS for SB 93 (JUD), ALASKA STATE LEGISLATURE’S 
MAJORITY ORG., 
http://www.akrepublicans.org/wagoner/23/spst/wago_sb093.php (May 9, 
2003) [hereinafter Sponsor Statement]. 
 2.  The specific requirements vary by statute, see, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-
503 (2009) (listing open, exclusive, and continuous as requirements), and 
common law, see, e.g., Moore v. Stills, 307 S.W.3d 71, 77–78 (Ky. 2010) (stating 
that adverse possession is “an amalgam of statutory and common law” and that 
for the statute of limitations to transfer title to an adverse possessor in Kentucky 
the common law requirements of hostile, actual, exclusive, continuous, open, 
and notorious must be met). 
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number of years.3 The doctrine has over 800 years of common law 
history,4 and it had over 100 years of history in Alaska prior to 2003.5 
Nevertheless, Jon Tillinghast—legal counsel for Sealaska Corporation, 
the author of Senate Bill 93—boldly declared to the Senate Judiciary 
Committee, “Justice Brandeis said that states serve as laboratories for 
improvement of our laws. . . . Alaska is the first state to take a hard look 
at . . . whether [adverse possession] serves any continuing social 
utility.”6 The house and senate had no trouble deciding that, at least in 
the case of “bad faith squatters,” adverse possession served no 
continuing utility,7 and the Governor signed Senate Bill 93 into law on 
July 17, 2003.8 
Prior to 2003, the Alaska Supreme Court’s adverse possession 
jurisprudence took Alaska’s unique circumstances into account in a way 
that was perhaps more favorable to adverse possessors than to record 
owners. For example, the Alaska Supreme Court has stated that the 
exclusivity and continuity of an adverse possession are determined in 
light of the character of the land in question and how an average owner 
would use the land.9 In the rural areas that constitute the vast majority 
of Alaska, the court has held that the continuity requirement may be met 
when the use is seasonal,10 and the exclusivity requirement may be met 
even though the adverse possessor allowed clamdiggers to use the 
property.11 Likewise, the court has held that lesser acts than would be 
required in urban areas may be sufficient to establish open possession in 
rural areas.12 Practically speaking, these lesser requirements may have 
made it easier for adverse possessors to gain title to rural land in Alaska. 
In addition, by focusing on the conduct of the adverse possessor, the 
court may have overlooked the fact that a record owner’s use of the land 
 
 3.  The number of years is set out in state statutes of limitation. See 
discussion infra Part II. 
 4.  See discussion infra Part I. 
 5.  See discussion infra Part II.A. 
 6.  S.B. 93-Adverse Possession, ALASKA S. JUDICIARY COMM. MINUTES, 23rd 
Leg. (Apr. 16, 2003) [hereinafter 4/16/03 Minutes] (statement of Jon Tillinghast, 
legal counsel for Sealaska Corporation). 
 7.  The vote in the senate was 15-5. ALASKA S. JOURNAL, 23rd Leg., 1st Sess. 
1281 (May 9, 2003). The vote in the house was 28-5, with seven members not 
voting. ALASKA H. JOURNAL, 23rd Leg., 1st Sess. 1924 (May 19, 2003). 
 8.  ALASKA S. JOURNAL, 23rd Leg., 1st Sess. 1841 (Aug. 20, 2003). 
 9.  Nome 2000 v. Fagerstrom, 799 P.2d 304, 309 (Alaska 1990). 
 10.  Vezey v. Green, 35 P.3d 14, 21 (Alaska 2001). 
 11.  Peters v. Juneau-Douglas Girl Scout Council, 519 P.2d 826, 831 (Alaska 
1974). 
 12.  Shilts v. Young, 567 P.2d 769, 776 (Alaska 1977). 
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also depends on its character.13 Although it is not at all clear that prior to 
2003 bad faith squatters were running rampantly around rural Alaska 
taking advantage of Alaska’s adverse possession law,14 the Alaska 
Legislature felt a need to provide record owners with additional 
protections. With Senate Bill 93, the legislature sought to remove “the 
harsh burden of policing . . . large expansive lands to insure [sic] that a 
squatter has not taken up residency.”15 
The statutory revisions in Senate Bill 93 effected sweeping changes 
to Alaska’s adverse possession law. However, these changes have gone 
relatively unnoticed.16 Moreover, the Alaska Supreme Court has not yet 
had the opportunity to define the exact contours of the revised statutes, 
so it is still unclear how the changes will play out in practice. This Note 
is an attempt to clarify Alaska’s adverse possession law and to point out 
some of the possible implications of the 2003 revisions. It begins by 
briefly examining the historical roots of adverse possession. Because 
much of Alaska’s pre-2003 adverse possession law will still be relevant 
under the revised statutes, Part II critically examines Alaska’s adverse 
possession law as it existed prior to 2003. Part III discusses the 2003 
revisions, and Part IV examines some of the implications of those 
revisions. 
 
 13.  See Alan Romero, Rural Property Law, 112 W. VA. L. REV. 765, 783–84 
(2010) (“[S]ome courts seem to recognize how certain rural qualities may affect 
the possessor’s conduct, but overlook or disregard how those same qualities 
may likewise affect the title owner’s conduct.”). 
 14.  None of the reported Alaska Supreme Court adverse possession 
decisions have involved an adverse possessor who went onto someone else’s 
land without any belief in ownership with the goal of gaining title. This fact was 
noted by attorney Ronald L. Baird in a House Judiciary Committee meeting. 
Baird argued the squatter that Senate Bill 93 contemplated was “mythical.” See 
S.B. 93-Adverse Possession, ALASKA H. JUDICIARY COMM. MINUTES, 23rd Leg. (May 
18, 2003) [hereinafter 5/18/03 Minutes II] (statement of Ronald L. Baird, attorney 
at law). 
 15. S.B. 93-Adverse Possession, ALASKA S. LABOR & COMMERCE COMM. 
MINUTES, 23rd Leg. (Mar. 11, 2003) [hereinafter 3/11/03 Minutes] (statement of 
Amy Seitz, staff to Senator Wagoner). More recently the legislature passed an act 
providing that “land use allowed by a landowner for a recreational activity 
without charge may not form the basis of a claim for adverse possession, 
prescriptive easement, or a similar claim.”  Recreating and Recreational 
Areas−Landowners−Immunity, Liability for Misconduct, Claims, and Use 
Easements, 2008 Alaska Sess. Laws ch. 116 (codified at ALASKA STAT. § 
09.65.202(e) (2010)). The only exception is actions brought under section 
09.45.052(d) of the Alaska Statutes, id., which is discussed in Part III.B, infra. 
 16.  This Author is aware of no law review articles and only one newspaper 
article discussing the revisions. 
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I. A BRIEF HISTORY OF ADVERSE POSSESSION AND ITS 
JUSTIFICATIONS 
The traditional adverse possession doctrine has its roots in early 
English statutes of limitations that barred actions to recover possession 
of land after a certain amount of time had passed.17 Today, all American 
states have statutes of limitation requiring that actions to recover land be 
brought within a certain amount of time.18 Most American statutes of 
limitation do not expressly state that the former owner can lose title to 
an adverse possessor after the running of the statute.19 However, courts 
have construed the statutes to transfer perfect title to adverse 
possessors.20 The ability to gain title via adverse possession originated at 
a time when title and possession were inseparable.21 Consequently, to 
show an adverse possession was sufficient to be equated with 
ownership, and thus that the true owner had a cause of action against 
the adverse possessor throughout the statutory period, a modern 
adverse possessor must generally prove her possession was actual, 
adverse, open and notorious, exclusive, continuous, and uninterrupted 
for the statutory period.22 
Traditional justifications for the doctrine of adverse possession 
include barring “stale” claims, punishing owners for their neglect, 
encouraging the development of land, and quieting title.23 The Alaska 
Supreme Court has stated: 
[T]he adverse possession statutes keep stale cases out of the 
courts . . . . They exist because of a belief “that title to land 
should not long be in doubt, that society will benefit from 
someone’s making use of land the owner leaves idle, and that 
 
 17.  3 THOMAS E. ATKINSON ET AL., AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 15.1 (A. 
James Casner ed., 1952). Statutes of limitation existed in England as early as the 
thirteenth century. Id. 
 18.  See 10 BUDDY O. H. HERRING ET AL., THOMPSON ON REAL PROPERTY, 
SECOND THOMAS EDITION § 87.01 (David A. Thomas ed., 1995) (listing statutes of 
limitation for all fifty states). The statutory periods range from five years to forty 
years. Id. 
 19.  3 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, supra note 17, § 15.1. 
 20.  See, e.g., Davis v. Mills, 194 U.S. 451, 457 (1904) (“The lapse of time 
limited by such statutes not only bars the remedy, but it extinguishes the right, 
and vests a perfect title in the adverse holder.” (quoting Leffingwell v. Warren, 
67 U.S. 599, 605 (1862))). 
 21.  10 THOMPSON ON REAL PROPERTY, supra note 18, § 87.04. 
 22.  Id.; 3 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, supra note 17, § 15.3. The specific 
requirements vary by state. See supra note 2. 
 23.  CHARLES C. CALLAHAN, ADVERSE POSSESSION 83–96 (1961). 
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third persons who come to regard the occupant as owner may 
be protected.”24 
Some modern scholars have suggested that the doctrine of adverse 
possession should be reformed because many of these traditional 
rationales are no longer relevant.25 Others have criticized adverse 
possession on the ground that it encourages the development—“and 
thus environmental degradation—of wild lands,”26 a concern 
particularly applicable to Alaska. Finally, in response to concerns about 
the potential inequity of adverse possession, a few legislatures in other 
states have taken steps to curb its application.27 However, none have 
been quite so bold as the Alaska Legislature. 
 
 24.  Alaska Nat’l Bank v. Linck, 559 P.2d 1049, 1054 (Alaska 1977) (quoting 
William B. Stoebuck, The Law of Adverse Possession in Washington, 35 WASH. L. 
REV. 53, 53 (1960)). Along the same lines, in Dillingham Commercial Company v. 
City of Dillingham, the court stated that the rationale for adverse possession 
statutes is the utility in promptly ending controversies “and in stabilizing long 
continued property uses.” 705 P.2d 410, 416 (Alaska 1985). 
 25.  See, e.g., Lee Anne Fennell, Efficient Trespass: The Case for “Bad Faith” 
Adverse Possession, 100 NW. U. L. REV. 1037, 1040–41 (2006) (stating that adverse 
possession is now best suited to the niche goal of transferring land to parties that 
value it more than the owners); Jeffrey Evans Stake, The Uneasy Case for Adverse 
Possession, 89 GEO. L.J. 2419, 2471–73 (2001) (suggesting reform of adverse 
possession law based on a loss-aversion rationale because “[r]ationales that 
easily justified the ancient English doctrine of adverse possession have been 
undermined”). 
 26.  See, e.g., John G. Sprankling, An Environmental Critique of Adverse 
Possession, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 816, 816 (1994). Sprankling also argued that 
American courts tended to make it easier to adversely possess wild lands than 
developed lands. Instead of requiring that adverse possessors do acts that would 
afford the true owner constructive notice, the courts instead require only that 
adverse possessors “use the land in the same manner that a reasonable owner 
would, in light of its nature, character and location.”  Id. at 825–31. The Alaska 
Supreme Court has used this language in its opinions. See infra note 65 and 
accompanying text. 
 27.  See, e.g., 2008 Colo. Sess. Laws 688 (codified at COLO. REV. STAT. § 38-41-
101 (2010)) (amending Colorado’s adverse possession statute to require a 
heightened burden of proof on adverse possessors, to require adverse possessors 
to prove a good faith belief in ownership, and to give courts the discretion to 
award damages to the person losing title); 1989 Or. Laws ch. 1069 (codified at 
OR. REV. STAT. § 105.620 (2009)) (amending Oregon’s adverse possession statute 
to require an honest belief in ownership). 
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II. ADVERSE POSSESSION LAW IN ALASKA BEFORE 2003 
A.  The Statutes Prior to 2003 
Alaska has two statutes governing adverse possession. Portions of 
these statutes existed before the 2003 amendments and were unchanged 
by the 2003 amendments. These portions read as follows: 
Sec. 09.10.030. Actions to recover real property. 
(a) [A] person may not bring an action for the recovery of real 
property or for the recovery of the possession of it unless the 
action is commenced within 10 years. An action may not be 
maintained . . . for the recovery unless it appears that the 
plaintiff, an ancestor, a predecessor, or the grantor of the 
plaintiff was seized or possessed of the premises in question 
within 10 years before the commencement of the action.28 
 
Sec. 09.45.052. Adverse Possession. 
(a) The uninterrupted adverse notorious possession of real 
property under color and claim of title for seven years or 
more . . . is conclusively presumed to give title to the property 
except as against the state or the United States.29 
The language of section 09.10.030(a) of the Alaska Statutes, as set 
forth above, became part of Alaska’s laws in 1884 when the Alaska 
Organic Act made the “general laws” of Oregon applicable to Alaska.30 
The statutory language remained the same after Alaska became an 
official territory in 191231 and after Alaska became a state in 1959.32 The 
 
 28.  ALASKA STAT. § 09.10.030(a) (2010). 
 29.  Id. § 09.45.052(a). 
 30.  An Act Providing for a Civil Government for Alaska, ch. 53, § 7, 23 Stat. 
24, 25–26 (1884). This Act incorporated Oregon’s statute of limitations. See HILL’S 
ANN. LAWS OF OR., ch. I, tit. II, § 4 (1887), which is identical to ALASKA STAT. § 
09.10.030(a). In addition, the Alaska Organic Act incorporated Oregon adverse 
possession law based on this statute of limitations. See Pioneer Mining Co. v. 
Pac. Coal Co., 4 Alaska 463, 477 (1912) (noting in an adverse possession case that 
Alaska adopted Oregon court decisions rendered prior to the adoption of 
Oregon’s laws in the Alaska Code).  Over sixty years after the Alaska Organic 
Act was passed, the Ninth Circuit noted that Alaska’s statute was copied from 
Oregon and relied on Oregon precedent to recognize the adverse possession 
doctrine of “tacking.”  Ringstad v. Grannis, 171 F.2d 170, 174 (9th Cir. 1948). 
 31.  See COMPILED LAWS OF THE TERRITORY OF ALASKA, tit. XIII, ch. 2, § 836 
(1913). 
 32.  See ALASKA STAT. § 09.10.030 (1962). 
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language of section 09.45.052(a) of the Alaska Statutes has a similarly 
long history in Alaska,33 though it did not come from Oregon.34 
Courts have construed these two statutes to give adverse 
possessors title to privately owned land35 when the land is occupied for 
the statutory period under certain conditions.36 An adverse possessor 
can tack her adverse possession to that of a predecessor as long as there 
is privity.37 Privity exists when there is “continuous possession by 
mutual consent.”38 Unlike many other states, Alaska does not have a 
statute that tolls the running of the statute of limitations when the true 
owner is a minor or under a disability when the adverse possessor 
enters the land.39 Also, although the Alaska Supreme Court has not 
previously addressed the issue, it would likely hold—as most states 
have—that the statutory period does not begin to run against the holder 
of a future interest until the future interest becomes possessory.40 
 
 33.  Congress enacted the language of section 09.45.052 in 1900. See An Act 
Making Further Provision for a Civil Government for Alaska, and for Other 
Purposes, ch. 786, § 98, 31 Stat. 321, 493 (1900), which is verbatim identical to the 
portion of section 09.45.052(a) written above. 
 34.  Compare CARTER’S ANN. LAWS OF ALASKA, tit. II, ch. 2, § 4 (1900) (noting 
that the predecessor to section 09.10.030(a) came from the laws of Oregon), with 
tit. II, ch. 100, § 1042 (not tracing the predecessor of 09.45.052(a) to the laws of 
Oregon). 
 35.  Statutes generally exempt government owned property from adverse 
possession. See ALASKA STAT. § 29.71.010 (2010) (no adverse possession against a 
municipality); id. § 38.95.010 (no adverse possession against the state); see also 
United States v. Vasarajs, 908 F.2d 443, 446 n.4 (9th Cir. 1990) (generally no 
adverse possession against the federal government). Some scholars have pointed 
out the discrepancy in allowing government entities to adversely possess against 
private individuals but not allowing private individuals to adversely possess 
against the government. See, e.g., Andrew Dick, Making Sense Out of Nonsense: A 
Response to Adverse Possession by Governmental Entities, 7 NEV. L.J. 348, 350–51 
(2006). This discrepancy was used by Senator Wagoner to argue in favor of 
Senate Bill 93. See Sponsor Statement, supra note 1 (“Under existing law, a person 
is prohibited from taking government property by adverse possession. SB 93 
simply accords some equal dignity and protection to private ownership 
rights.”). 
 36.  These conditions are discussed in Parts II.B.2 & 3, infra. 
 37.  Hubbard v. Curtiss, 684 P.2d 842, 849 (Alaska 1984). 
 38.  Penn v. Ivey, 615 P.2d 1, 4 (Alaska 1980). 
 39.  For an example of another state’s statute, see TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. 
CODE ANN. § 16.022 (West 2010). 
 40.  1 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, supra note 17, § 4.113. The reason for this 
rule is that the owner of a future interest has no present right to possession and 
so has no cause of action against the adverse possessor. Id. 
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B.  The Alaska Supreme Court’s Pre-2003 Adverse Possession 
Jurisprudence 
1.  Section 09.10.030(a) 
On its face, section 09.10.030(a) of the Alaska Statutes lists two 
requirements plaintiffs must meet in order to file suit to recover real 
property: (1) the plaintiff must file suit within ten years, and (2) the 
plaintiff or his predecessor in interest must have been “seized or 
possessed” of the land sometime during the ten years preceding the 
filing of the lawsuit. Requirement one is fairly straightforward, but 
requirement two poses the question of what is meant by “seized or 
possessed.” Seisin is an ancient concept rooted in English feudal law.41 
In the thirteenth century, seisin was synonymous with possession.42 
Over time the concepts of seisin and possession were separated,43 and 
seisin came to refer to ownership of a freehold estate.44 Lessees merely 
had possession, not seisin.45 Easements were considered “use” interests 
in land, not possessory interests.46 
The only insight into how the Alaska Supreme Court interprets the 
phrase “seized or possessed” is contained in the 1977 case Shilts v. 
Young.47 In Shilts, the trial court had equated seisin with physical 
possession.48 The Alaska Supreme Court stated: 
It is not necessary for a titleholder to be in physical possession 
of land for any period of time in order to assert his rights. 
[Section 09.10.030 of the Alaska Statutes] states in part that an 
action for recovery of real property may not be maintained 
unless the plaintiff or his predecessor was “seized or possessed 
of the premises in question within 10 years before the 
commencement of the action.” The statute uses the term 
“seized” in the sense of having legal title.49 
 
 41.  2 THOMPSON ON REAL PROPERTY, supra note 18, § 17.01(b). 
 42.  Id.; 1 HERBERT THORNDIKE TIFFANY & BASIL JONES, THE LAW OF REAL 
PROPERTY § 20 (3d ed. 1939). 
 43.  See 2 THOMPSON ON REAL PROPERTY, supra note 18, § 17.01(b) (detailing 
the historical understanding of seisin and possession). 
 44.  Id.; 1 TIFFANY & JONES, supra note 42, § 20. Freehold estates include fee 
simple estates and life estates. 1 TIFFANY & JONES, supra note 42, § 25. 
 45.  1 TIFFANY & JONES, supra note 42, § 20; 4 THOMPSON ON REAL PROPERTY, 
supra note 18, § 39.04. 
 46.  7 THOMPSON ON REAL PROPERTY, supra note 18, § 60.02(c). Real covenants 
and equitable servitudes are also considered non-possessory interests in land. Id. 
vol. 4, § 39.04. 
 47.  567 P.2d 769 (Alaska 1977). 
 48.  See id. at 775 n.22. 
 49.  Id. 
MORAWETZ.FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 11/21/2011 5:25 PM 
2011 ADVERSE POSSESSION 349 
In Shilts, the Alaska Supreme Court was most likely recognizing the 
concept of “constructive seisin”—the idea that a record owner of a fee 
estate need not have actual possession in order to have seisin. Although 
Shilts had not been in physical possession of the property in question 
within the last ten years,50 he had record title.51 Consequently, he had a 
right to possession and so was constructively seized.52 The concept of 
constructive seisin has long been recognized in American property 
law,53 and the U.S. Supreme Court has suggested the concept might be 
particularly applicable to remote pieces of property54 such as the one at 
issue in Shilts.55 The cases cited by the Alaska Supreme Court in Shilts in 
support of its statement that the term “seized” means “having legal 
title” indicate that the court was recognizing the concept of constructive 
seisin.56 However, although the court most likely adopted the more 
plausible interpretation of section 09.10.030(a)—that “seized” refers to 
owners of freehold estates and “possessed” refers to owners of leasehold 
estates—it is possible to read Shilts as equating seisin with ownership of 
any interest in land.57 But, since the phrase “seized or possessed” in 
 
 50.  See id. at 771, 775 n.22. 
 51.  Id. at 775 n.22. 
 52.  See id.; see also infra note 56 and accompanying text. 
 53.  See, e.g., Whitehead v. Foley, 28 Tex. 268, 268 (1866) (stating that in 
America there is generally no difference between actual and constructive seisin 
and that conveyance by deed “carries the legal seisin, and gives constructive 
possession to the grantee”). In Whitehead, the Texas Supreme Court used the 
terms “seizin in deed” and “seizin in law,” see id., which refer to actual seisin 
and constructive seisin, respectively. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1480 (9th ed. 
2009). 
 54.  See Green v. Liter, 12 U.S. 229, 249 (1814) (holding the grantee of a 
conveyance of wild or vacant lands has constructive seisin). 
 55.  See Shilts, 567 P.2d at 771. 
 56.  The court cited Williams v. Swango, 7 N.E.2d 306 (Ill. 1937), and Beneficial 
Life Insurance Company v. Wakamatsu, 270 P.2d 830 (Idaho 1954). Shilts, 567 P.2d at 
775 n.22. Both cases suggest that the court was recognizing that the legal owner 
of a freehold estate has a right to possession and therefore need not have actual 
possession in order to have seisin. See Beneficial Life, 270 P.2d at 834 (“[S]eizin 
generally follows the legal title . . . .”); Williams, 7 N.E.2d at 309 (holding holder 
of a reversionary interest did not have constructive seisin because she did not 
have an immediate right to possession). The court also cited Carley v. Davis, 452 
P.2d 772 (Okla. 1969). Shilts, 567 P.2d at 775 n.22. However, it is unclear to this 
Author how Carley supports the proposition for which the Alaska Supreme 
Court cited it. 
 57.  Some modern commentators have suggested that in modern statutes, 
seisin is usually synonymous with ownership. See, e.g., CORNELIUS J. MOYNIHAN 
& SHELDON F. KURTZ, INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY 31 (3d ed. 
2002). As an example, Moynihan and Kurtz cited Dial v. Dial, 38 N.E.2d 43 (Ill. 
1941). MOYNIHAN & KURTZ, supra, at 31. In Dial, the Illinois Supreme Court held 
that in the Probate Act, the Illinois Legislature “did not use the word ‘seized’ in 
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section 09.10.030(a) dates back to at least 1884,58 there is a strong 
argument that the intended meaning at the time the statutory language 
was adopted was for “seized” to refer to owners of freehold estates and 
for “possessed” to refer to owners of leasehold estates. 
To summarize, section 09.10.030(a) imposes requirements on 
plaintiffs who wish to file suit to recover property from an adverse 
possessor. First, the plaintiff must have had title to a freehold estate in 
the land (i.e. seisin) or have possessed the land as a lessee within the ten 
years prior to the filing of the suit. Second, the plaintiff must file the suit 
within ten years after the date on which the adverse possession began. If 
the plaintiff does not file suit within ten years, then the plaintiff’s suit is 
barred, and the adverse possessor may be able to gain title to the 
property. 
2.  The Common Law Elements of Adverse Possession 
In order for the statute of limitations contained in section 
09.10.030(a) to transfer title to an adverse possessor, the adverse 
possessor must have occupied the land in a continuous, open and 
notorious, exclusive, and hostile manner for ten years or more, during 
which time the true owner cannot have filed a lawsuit or done 
something else to interrupt the adverse possession.59 An adverse 
possessor can file a lawsuit under section 09.10.030(a) without reference 
to another statute,60 such as the quiet title statute.61 
In one of its earliest adverse possession decisions, the Alaska 
Supreme Court stated, “[T]he main purpose of nearly all the [adverse 
possession] requirements is essentially the same, that is, to put the 
record owner on notice of the existence of an adverse claimant.”62 The 
court has also suggested that a purpose of the requirements is to 
overcome the presumption that the possession was with the true 
owner’s permission and in subordination to his title, or in other words, 
 
its technical sense, but meant thereby the same as if it had used the word 
‘owned.’” 38 N.E.2d at 48. 
 58.  See supra note 30 and accompanying text. 
 59.  See Alaska Nat’l Bank v. Linck, 559 P.2d 1049, 1052 (Alaska 1977) (“An 
interruption of possession caused by the record owner . . . tolls the running of 
the statute of limitations.”); Peters v. Juneau-Douglas Girl Scout Council, 519 
P.2d 826, 830 & n.13 (Alaska 1974) (listing the elements of continuous, open, 
notorious, exclusive, and hostile and noting that section 09.10.030(a) provides 
“the method by which a claimant may establish a new title by adverse 
possession”). 
 60.  See McGill v. Wahl, 839 P.2d 393, 396 (Alaska 1992) (treating the 
plaintiff’s suit “as one brought under the statute of limitations”). 
 61.  ALASKA STAT. § 09.45.010 (2010). 
 62.  Peters, 519 P.2d at 830. 
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to prove that the possession was truly “adverse.”63 An adverse possessor 
must prove by clear and convincing evidence that his possession met the 
requirements.64 However, in analyzing whether an adverse possessor 
met the requirements, courts consider “the character of the property” 
and whether the adverse possessor used it “as ‘an average owner of 
similar property would use and enjoy it.’”65 In adverse possession cases 
involving undeveloped, wild land—a substantial portion of the land in 
Alaska—the Alaska Supreme Court has not been stringent in 
determining the degree of possession sufficient to meet the adverse 
possession requirements,66 despite the fact that leniently interpreting the 
elements does not further the goal of putting the record owner on 
notice.67 
In Nome 2000 v. Fagerstrom, the Alaska Supreme Court stated: “The 
first three conditions—continuity, notoriety and exclusivity—describe 
the physical requirements of the [adverse possession] doctrine.”68 To 
establish continuity, an adverse possessor must show that he used the 
land in question for ten years “as an average owner of similar property 
would use it.”69 Alaska’s geography and climate make many pieces of 
property unsuitable for winter use, so seasonal use may be sufficient to 
establish continuity.70 If the record owner or a third party physically 
interrupts the possession, continuity is destroyed.71 
 
 63.  See Ayers v. Day & Night Fuel Co., 451 P.2d 579, 581 (Alaska 1969). 
 64.  Curran v. Mount, 657 P.2d 389, 391–92 (Alaska 1982). 
 65.  See Alaska Nat’l Bank v. Linck, 559 P.2d 1049, 1052 (Alaska 1977) 
(quoting 3 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, supra note 17, § 15.3). 
 66.  See, e.g., Nome 2000 v. Fagerstrom, 799 P.2d 304, 309–10 (Alaska 1990) 
(holding seasonal subsistence and recreational use of land sufficient to establish 
title by adverse possession); Linck, 559 P.2d at 1053 (“We cannot expect the 
possessor of uninhabited and forested land to do what the possessor of urban 
residential land would do before we charge the record owner with notice.”); cf. 
Grantland M. Clapacs, Note, “When in Nome . . .”: Custom, Culture and the 
Objective Standard in Alaskan Adverse Possession Law, 11 ALASKA L. REV. 301, 304 
(1994) (arguing that the Alaska Supreme Court’s decision in Nome v. Fagerstrom 
“lowered the standard for determining the elements of adverse possession too 
greatly”). 
 67.  See Romero, supra note 13, at 787 (“If adverse possession of undeveloped 
rural land may be less intensive . . . record owners of such rural land would have 
to be more diligent in monitoring their property . . . . Furthermore, even greater 
effort may be required when the land is forested, remote, or otherwise difficult 
to monitor.”). 
 68.  799 P.2d at 309. 
 69.  Id. 
 70.  Vezey v. Green, 35 P.3d 14, 21 (Alaska 2001). 
 71.  Linck, 559 P.2d at 1052. In a prescriptive easement case, the Alaska 
Supreme Court stated that interrupting the possession and negating continuity 
would usually require physically blocking access to an easement. McDonald v. 
Harris, 978 P.2d 81, 83 (Alaska 1999). Presumably, a similar physical act would 
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Similar to continuity, exclusivity is determined by considering how 
an average owner would use the land in question, so complete 
exclusivity is not required.72 For example, in Peters v. Juneau-Douglas Girl 
Scout Council, Peters successfully gained title through adverse 
possession by making regular use of the property in question; in 
allowing clamdiggers to use the property, he “was merely acting as any 
other hospitable landowner might.”73 The main purpose of the 
exclusivity requirement seems to be to prove that the adverse possessor 
was doing something to distinguish himself as an “owner” rather than 
someone acting in common with the general public.74 
Practically speaking, openness and notoriety are the same thing; a 
fact the Alaska Supreme Court has implicitly recognized by conflating 
the two requirements.75 “The function of the [open and notorious] 
requirement is to afford the true owner an opportunity for notice. . . . 
[A]ctual notice is not required; the true owner is charged with knowing 
what a reasonably diligent owner would have known.”76 The possession 
must be “reasonably visible”77 so that “if the owner visits property, he 
[will] be put on notice and be able to assert his rights.”78 The Alaska 
Supreme Court favors the use of the word “notorious” over the word 
“open.”79 However, the use of the word “notorious” is misleading.80 
 
be required in an adverse possession case. Of course, the record owner could 
also interrupt the continuity by bringing a lawsuit within ten years. 
 72.  Peters v. Juneau-Douglas Girl Scout Council, 519 P.2d 826, 831 (Alaska 
1974). 
 73.  Id. at 828, 830–31. See also Vezey, 35 P.3d at 22 (allowing relatives to take 
small quantities of rock from property did not destroy exclusivity); Nome 2000, 
799 P.2d at 310 (allowing others to pick berries and fish on remote parcel of land 
did not destroy exclusivity). 
 74. See Peters, 519 P.2d at 830 (“An owner would have no reason to believe 
that a person was making a claim of ownership inconsistent with his own if that 
person’s possession was not exclusive, but in participation with the owner or 
with general public.”); see also Clapacs, supra note 66, at 312–13 (suggesting that 
exclusivity works in conjunction with hostility to provide evidence that the 
adverse possessor “intends to appropriate the land”). 
 75.  See, e.g., Vezey, 35 P.3d at 20, 22 (listing “open and notorious” as an 
element of adverse possession and then analyzing it as a single requirement). 
 76.  Nome 2000, 799 P.2d at 309 n.7. If the true owner has actual notice, then 
the notoriety requirement is met. See Vezey, 35 P.3d at 22. 
 77.  Bentley Family Trust v. Lynx Enters., Inc., 658 P.2d 761, 766 (Alaska 
1983). 
 78.  Alaska Nat’l Bank v. Linck, 559 P.2d 1049, 1053 (Alaska 1977). 
 79.  See, e.g., Vezey, 35 P.3d at 20, 22 (analyzing the “open and notorious” 
requirement as the “notoriety” requirement).  The preference for the word 
notoriety could be due to the use of the term in section 09.45.052(a) of the Alaska 
Statutes and the conflating of the standards for section 09.10.030(a) and section 
09.45.052(a) cases. See ALASKA STAT. § 09.45.052(a) (2010); text accompanying 
notes 100–112, infra. 
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There is in fact no requirement that the adverse possession be well-
known; rather, community repute is relevant to whether there was 
enough evidence of possession to charge the true owner with inquiry 
notice.81 Community repute of ownership without physical evidence of 
possession is not sufficient to establish adverse possession.82 
Consequently, it is more accurate to state that the possession must be 
open, or “reasonably visible,” rather than “notorious.” 
As with exclusivity and continuity, the same acts are not required 
to establish open possession of rural or uninhabited lands as for urban 
lots.83 In a rural area, an adverse possessor who planted a garden, 
erected a barricade, posted a sign prohibiting hunting, granted an 
easement, and picked up litter maintained sufficiently open possession 
to charge the true owner with notice.84 Another rural adverse possessor 
met the open requirement by building a picnic area, parking a camper 
trailer, building an outhouse and fish rack, planting trees, and 
constructing a reindeer shelter.85 However, a would-be adverse 
possessor who flew over a piece of rural land several times a year and 
went onto the property at least once per year to walk the boundaries did 
not meet the requirement.86 In more urban settings, filling a slough with 
tailings and using it for parking automobiles, constructing a trailer 
court,87 and building a fence for a driveway88 were each sufficiently 
open to establish title by adverse possession. However, a would-be 
adverse possessor who rototilled, seeded, and mowed a portion of lawn 
and used part of it as a volleyball court did not meet the “open” 
requirement.89 
 
 80.  Webster’s New World Dictionary defines “notorious” as “well-known” or 
“publicly discussed.” WEBSTER’S NEW WORLD DICTIONARY 928 (Victoria Neufeldt 
and David B. Guralnik eds., 3d College ed. 1988). 
 81.  See Linck, 559 P.2d at 1053. If the community had notice, the record 
owner probably should also have had notice. However, it is possible to imagine 
a scenario in which an adverse possessor builds a cabin in the middle of a large 
parcel of rural land and lives there for ten years. In this case, the record owner 
would almost certainly be charged with notice, regardless of whether anyone 
else in the area knew of the adverse possession. 
 82.  Shilts v. Young, 567 P.2d 769, 776 (Alaska 1977). Of course, community 
repute that someone is asserting a right to a piece of land would likely originate 
from physical evidence of possession. 
 83.  Id. 
 84.  Linck, 559 P.2d at 1051, 1053. 
 85.  Nome 2000 v. Fagerstrom, 799 P.2d 304, 307–08, 310 (Alaska 1990). 
 86.  Shilts, 567 P.2d at 772, 777. 
 87.  Bentley Family Trust v. Lynx Enters., Inc., 658 P.2d 761, 766, 768 (Alaska 
1983). 
 88.  Penn v. Ivey, 615 P.2d 1, 3–4 (Alaska 1980). 
 89.  Tenala, Ltd. v. Fowler, 921 P.2d 1114, 1121–22 (Alaska 1996). 
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The final adverse possession requirement, hostility, is an objective 
requirement that the adverse possessor act as if he owns the land.90 
Whether the adverse possessor actually believes he owns the land and 
his good or bad faith are irrelevant.91 By treating the land as an owner 
would, the adverse possessor’s possession is sufficiently hostile to 
overcome the presumption that he possessed the land in subordination 
to the true owner’s title.92 Absent evidence of permission,93 the same 
evidence that establishes that the adverse possessor occupied land with 
the exclusivity, continuity, and openness of an average owner of similar 
land will generally also establish that “the adverse possessor held the 
land in such a way that his interest in the property was incompatible 
with the record owner’s interest.”94 One notable exception is a tenant at 
sufferance, who must perform some distinct act, other than nonpayment 
of rent, to establish hostility.95 On the other end of the spectrum, in the 
case of a parol gift of land, a donee’s claim to the property is 
presumptively hostile to that of the donor.96 
If the continuity, exclusivity, openness, and hostility elements are 
met, then title to the extent of land “actually possessed” for the statutory 
period automatically vests in the adverse possessor.97 In Vezey v. Green, 
the Alaska Supreme Court stated: “Evidence of actual possession must 
be sufficient to alert a reasonably diligent owner to the possessor’s 
exercise of dominion and control.”98 Since this is essentially a 
restatement of the purpose of the adverse possession elements,99 it 
 
 90.  Peters v. Juneau-Douglas Girl Scout Council, 519 P.2d 826, 832 (Alaska 
1974). 
 91.  Id.; see also Nome 2000 v. Fagerstrom, 799 P.2d 304, 310 (noting that 
whether the defendants had a traditional Alaska Native mindset toward land 
ownership was irrelevant to determining whether the defendants objectively 
acted as if they owned the land). 
 92.  Hamerly v. Denton, 359 P.2d 121, 126 (Alaska 1961). 
 93.  Permission requires more than acquiescence of the true owner; it 
requires “acknowledgment by the possessor that he holds in subordination to 
the owner’s title.” Hubbard v. Curtiss, 684 P.2d 842, 848 (Alaska 1984). 
 94.  Glover v. Glover, 92 P.3d 387, 392 (Alaska 2004); see also Nome 2000, 799 
P.2d at 310 (indicating that since the acts that established continuity, exclusivity, 
and notoriety of the defendant’s possession were “consistent with ownership” 
and since the plaintiff offered no proof that the defendant acted with anyone’s 
permission, the defendant met the hostility requirement). 
 95.  Glover, 92 P.3d at 393–94. 
 96.  Vezey v. Green, 35 P.3d 14, 24 (Alaska 2001). Similarly, in color of title 
cases brought under section 09.45.052(a), discussed in Part II.B.3, infra, the 
possession of a grantee is presumptively hostile to his grantor. Hubbard, 684 P.2d 
at 848. 
 97.  See Hubbard, 684 P.2d at 849; Bentley Family Trust v. Lynx Enters., Inc., 
658 P.2d 761, 768 (Alaska 1983). 
 98.  35 P.3d at 25. 
 99.  See supra text accompanying note 59. 
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stands to reason that the adverse possessor gets title to the extent of land 
to which all the elements apply, although natural boundaries may also 
be relevant.100 
3.  Section 09.45.052(a) and Color of Title 
Unlike section 09.10.030(a), section 09.45.052(a) specifically lists 
requirements an adverse possessor must meet in order to gain title by 
adverse possession. The statute says that “[t]he uninterrupted adverse 
notorious possession of real property under color and claim of title for 
seven years or more . . . is conclusively presumed to give title.”101 
Reading the statute literally, to gain title under section 09.45.052(a) an 
adverse possessor must prove: (1) color of title, (2) continuity, (3) 
hostility, and (4) notoriety.102 The word “conclusively” implies that these 
are the only elements that must be met, so unlike claims based on 
section 09.10.030(a), exclusivity is not required.103 
In one of its earliest color of title decisions, Alaska National Bank v. 
Linck, the Alaska Supreme Court stated: 
[The three adjectives in section 09.45.052(a)] represent the three 
concepts underlying the law of adverse possession: (1) the 
possession must have been continuous and uninterrupted; (2) 
the possessor must have acted as if he were the owner and not 
merely one acting with the permission of the owner; and (3) the 
possession must have been reasonably visible to the record 
owner.”104 
This statement simply elaborates on the meanings of the three 
adjectives. The possession must be continuous, which implies 
uninterrupted.105 It must be hostile, which means the possessor must 
have acted as if he were the owner.106 Finally, it must be notorious, or 
 
 100.  Vezey, 35 P.3d at 24. 
 101.  ALASKA STAT. § 09.45.052(a) (2010). 
 102.  Continuous is synonymous with uninterrupted, and hostile is 
synonymous with adverse. See Alaska Nat’l Bank v. Linck, 559 P.2d 1049, 1052–
53 (Alaska 1977) (interpreting “continuous” and “uninterrupted” as the same 
requirement and “adverse” and “hostile” as the same requirement). 
 103.  The Alaska Supreme Court has stated that it “presume[s] . . . every word 
in [a] statute was intentionally included, and must be given some effect.” 
Municipality of Anchorage v. Suzuki, 41 P.3d 147, 151 (Alaska 2002). 
Furthermore, each word in a statute should be interpreted according to its 
“common and approved usage.” ALASKA STAT. § 01.10.040 (2010). Employing 
these rules of construction, giving effect to the word “conclusively” means that 
exclusivity need not be proved to prevail under section 09.45.052(a). 
 104.  559 P.2d at 1052. 
 105.  See supra note 71 and accompanying text. 
 106.  See supra notes 90–96 and accompanying text. 
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open, which means reasonably visible to the record owner.107 Exclusivity 
is not part of this statement, and in Linck exclusivity did not enter into 
the court’s analysis.108 Moreover, the court has implicitly recognized that 
the test presented above does not include exclusivity by using it to 
decide cases involving prescriptive easements, which do not require 
exclusivity.109 
Unfortunately, two of the court’s decisions subsequent to Linck 
muddied this important distinction between section 09.45.052(a) and 
section 09.10.030(a). In a case decided just a few months after Linck, the 
court stated that the plaintiff adverse possessor was required to prove 
“open, notorious, continuous, exclusive and hostile possession” under 
either statute.110 A few years later, the court suggested that adverse 
possessors must satisfy the same requirements under either statute and 
then used the Linck test for a section 09.10.030(a) case.111 Although 
several later cases seemed to once again recognize the distinction based 
on the “exclusivity” element,112 a very recent Alaska Supreme Court 
decision stated that plaintiffs must prove the same elements under both 
statutes.113 The Alaska Supreme Court should explicitly recognize that 
unlike claims based on section 09.10.030(a), claims based on section 
09.45.052(a) do not require exclusivity. 
For section 09.45.052(a) to apply, the adverse possessor must have 
color of title. Three conditions establish color of title: (1) the adverse 
possessor has a written document purporting to transfer title to him; (2) 
the written document accurately describes the land claimed by the 
adverse possessor; and (3) the adverse possession was in good faith.114 
An adverse possessor meets the good faith requirement if he had “an 
honest belief based on reasonable grounds that he had valid title to the 
land when he entered it.”115 If the adverse possessor has color of title for 
 
 107.  See supra notes 75–77 and accompanying text. 
 108.  See 559 P.2d at 1050–54. 
 109.  See, e.g., Interior Trails Pres. Coal. v. Swope, 115 P.3d 527, 529–30 (Alaska 
2005). 
 110.  Shilts v. Young, 567 P.2d 769, 773 (Alaska 1977) (emphasis added). 
 111.  Bentley Family Trust v. Lynx Enters., Inc., 658 P.2d 761, 764–65 (Alaska 
1983). 
 112.  See, e.g., Vezey v. Green, 35 P.3d 14, 20 (Alaska 2001) (using the elements 
of continuous, open, exclusive, and hostile to decide a section 09.10.030(a) case); 
Snook v. Bowers, 12 P.3d 771, 779–84 (Alaska 2000) (using the Linck test to 
decide a section 09.45.052(a) case). 
 113.  See Cowan v. Yeisley, 255 P.3d 966, 972 (Alaska 2011). 
 114.  Snook, 12 P.3d at 780. It is worth nothing that a certificate of sale from a 
tax sale does not serve as color of title. The possessor needs the tax deed, issued 
after the owner’s right of redemption has expired, in order to have color of title. 
Wells v. Noey, 380 P.2d 876, 879 (Alaska 1963). 
 115.  Snook, 12 P.3d at 781. 
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the entire statutory period,116 then the continuous, hostile, and open 
adverse possession need only be for a period of seven years in order to 
transfer title to the adverse possessor.117 The Alaska Supreme Court has 
stated that the rationale for the shortened prescriptive period “is most 
logically attributable to a belief that a person holding land under color of 
title will be more likely to make improvements and otherwise commit 
himself to that land.”118 When land is successfully adversely possessed 
under color of title, the written evidence of color of title, rather than the 
area physically possessed by the adverse possessor, determines the 
extent of the land to which title is acquired.119 
4.  Prescriptive Easements 
The law of prescriptive easements is nearly identical to the law of 
adverse possession, except that prescriptive easements are based on use 
rather than full possession.120 At the end of the prescriptive period, the 
adverse user gets an easement rather than full title.121 In Alaska, section 
09.10.030(a) has been relied on as authorizing courts to establish 
prescriptive easements,122 and the test for prescriptive easements is 
essentially identical to the Linck test for color of title cases.123 To establish 
an easement by prescription: (1) the use must be continuous, (2) the user 
must act as if she owns an easement and not as if she is using the land 
with the permission of the fee owner (i.e. the use must be “hostile”), and 
(3) the use must be reasonably visible to the fee owner (i.e. the use must 
be “open”).124 Exclusivity is not a requirement to establish a prescriptive 
easement.125 However, the Alaska Supreme Court has suggested that a 
 
 116.  See Wells, 380 P.2d at 877–79 (holding Noey did not get title after seven 
years of possession because he did not have color of title during the first two 
years). 
 117.  ALASKA STAT. § 09.45.052(a) (2010). 
 118.  Lott v. Muldoon Rd. Baptist Church, Inc., 466 P.2d 815, 818 (Alaska 
1970). 
 119.  Id. at 817–18. An exception to this rule occurs when the record owner is 
in actual possession of part of the property. Ault v. State, 688 P.2d 951, 955–56 
(Alaska 1984). 
 120.  McDonald v. Harris, 978 P.2d 81, 83 (Alaska 1999); 7 THOMPSON ON REAL 
PROPERTY, supra note 18, § 60.03(b)(6)(i). 
 121.  7 THOMPSON ON REAL PROPERTY, supra note 18, § 60.03(b)(6)(i). 
 122.  McGill v. Wahl, 839 P.2d 393, 396 (Alaska 1992). 
 123.  Compare id., with supra text accompanying note 102. 
 124.  See McGill, 839 P.2d at 397. 
 125.  Id. at 398. In McGill v. Wahl, the court misleadingly noted that exclusivity 
is relevant to determining whether the use was “under a claim of right.” Id. 
“Claim of right” is not a separate element that must be proved in order to 
establish an easement by prescription. See Nelson v. Green Constr. Co., 515 P.2d 
1225, 1228 n.15 (Alaska 1973) (indicating that claim of right refers to whether an 
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use might be so shared that it would be impossible to determine that a 
prescriptive easement existed in a single individual.126 In this case, a 
public prescriptive easement might be created.127 
The continuity, hostility, and openness requirements are 
interpreted similarly in the prescriptive easement context as in the 
adverse possession context. What counts as continuous use depends on 
the character of the land in question.128 For example, failure to plow and 
use a road in winter in Fairbanks would not necessarily negate 
continuity.129 The hostility requirement is met and the presumption of 
permission is overcome if the user “contemplates uninterrupted future 
use”130 and acts “as if he were claiming a permanent right to the 
easement.”131 Finally, the openness requirement is met if the use would 
have been noticed by a duly alert fee owner.132 If the fee owner knew of 
the use, then the adverse possessor must be able to show that the fee 
owner did not grant permission.133 
In 1985, the Alaska Supreme Court held that public easements can 
also be created by prescription.134 The requirements to establish a public 
prescriptive easement are the same as for private prescriptive 
easements.135 “The only difference is that a public prescriptive easement 
requires qualifying use by the public, while a private prescriptive 
 
adverse possession is hostile enough to overcome the presumption of 
permission). 
 126.  See McGill, 839 P.2d at 398. In McGill the court stated, “We are not so 
persuaded that the . . . use of the roadway was so shared as to overcome the 
presumption that the easement existed. [The adverse users] were the primary 
and only consistent users of the roadway.” Id. A later case took this to mean that 
the adverse user must be the primary user and that third parties can only be 
occasional users. See McDonald v. Harris, 978 P.2d 81, 84 (Alaska 1999). Such an 
interpretation seems at odds with the lack of an exclusivity requirement. A 
better interpretation is probably that if a use is so shared, a public, rather than 
private, prescriptive easement might be created. See infra note 127. 
 127.  See Swift v. Kniffen, 706 P.2d 296, 304–05 (Alaska 1985) (suggesting the 
plaintiffs might want to ask for leave to amend their complaint to include a 
public prescriptive easement claim because the disputed roadway was used by 
several neighbors as well as members of the public). 
 128.  McDonald, 978 P.2d at 83. 
 129.  See Swift, 706 P.2d at 303. 
 130.  Weidner v. State, 860 P.2d 1205, 1210 (Alaska 1993). 
 131.  Swift, 706 P.2d at 303. 
 132.  McDonald, 978 P.2d at 85. 
 133.  Swift, 706 P.2d at 304. 
 134.  Dillingham Commercial Co. v. City of Dillingham, 705 P.2d 410, 416 
(Alaska 1985). 
 135.  See Daniel W. Beardsley, Public Prescriptive Rights across Private Lands, 
ASLPS STANDARDS AND PRACTICE MANUAL 1 (1994), available at 
http://www.alaskapls.org/standards/prescription.pdf (“[T]he requirements to 
establish a public prescriptive easement are essentially the same as private 
easements.”). 
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easement requires qualifying use only by the private party.”136 Although 
a public prescriptive easement gives the public at large the right to use 
the easement, the public may only use the easement “for those types of 
uses that led to its establishment” and “closely related ancillary uses.”137 
For example, in Price v. Eastham, the court held that when a public 
prescriptive easement was established for snowmachine use, other types 
of users—such as hunters and berry-pickers—could not use the 
easement without independently satisfying the public prescriptive 
easement requirements.138 
III. THE 2003 STATUTORY REVISIONS 
A.  The Passage of Senate Bill 93 
In 2003, at the request of Sealaska Corporation,139 Alaska Senator 
Thomas H. Wagoner introduced Senate Bill 93 in order to “repeal the 
Doctrine of Adverse Possession in the case of ‘bad faith’ trespassers.”140 
The Anchorage Daily News quoted Senator Wagoner as stating: 
Our law, right now, allows a person who has no claim of 
ownership to squat on someone else’s property and, as a result 
of their illegal trespass, the squatter could actually secure title 
to the property they are squatting on. That is simply legal 
thievery—to me, that is offensive and it needs to stop.”141 
In his sponsor statement, Senator Wagoner suggested that adverse 
possession was a relic of the Middle Ages that served no purpose in 
present day Alaska.142 
Shortly after the introduction of Senate Bill 93, in a meeting of the 
Senate Labor and Commerce Standing Committee, Russell Dick, then 
the Natural Resources Manager for Sealaska Corporation, discussed 
how Senate Bill 93 would benefit Sealaska. He noted that Sealaska owns 
 
 136.  Interior Trails Pres. Coal. v. Swope, 115 P.3d 527, 529 (Alaska 2005). 
 137.  Price v. Eastham, 254 P.3d 1121, 1126 (Alaska 2011). 
 138.  Id. at 1127. 
 139.  4/16/03 Minutes, supra note 6 (statement of Sen. Wagoner). Sealaska 
authored Senate Bill 93. Id. (statement of Jon Tillinghast). Its specific motivation 
may have been a lengthy legal proceeding initiated to have a trespasser evicted 
from Sealaska land. See 3/11/03 Minutes, supra note 15 (statement of Russell Dick, 
former Resources Manager of Sealaska). 
 140.  Sponsor Statement, supra note 1. 
 141.  Senate Passes Bill to Stop ‘Legal Thievery of Property,’ ANCHORAGE DAILY 
NEWS, May 14, 2003, at B9. 
 142.  See Sponsor Statement, supra note 1 (“Adverse Possession was born some 
800 years ago during the Middle Ages, but incredibly still applies in the State of 
Alaska.”). 
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hundreds of thousands of acres of land in southeast Alaska and that 
policing that land was a substantial burden.143 Mr. Dick also noted that, 
unlike Sealaska, private landowners might have very limited financial 
resources to devote to policing their land.144 Amy Seitz, staff of Senator 
Wagoner, suggested that adverse possession law was antiquated and 
that it was unfair for private landowners to be subject to adverse 
possession law when government entities are not.145 
Pete Putzier, Assistant Attorney General, objected to the bill on the 
grounds that it would impose undue hardship on the Department of 
Transportation and Public Facilities, which he claimed frequently relied 
on adverse possession to clear title to roads in order to get federal 
money for road improvement projects.146 In addition, two interested 
citizens said that while they supported doing away with “squatters’ 
rights,” they were concerned that the bill would eliminate prescriptive 
easements, which they believed served important purposes.147 
As Senate Bill 93 worked its way through various committee 
meetings, concerns about private easements and rights-of-way were 
often at the forefront of the discussions over whether adverse possession 
still served any useful purpose. A land surveyor expressed concern that 
many people in the Fairbanks Northstar Borough use driveways that 
pass over someone else’s property, and they rely on adverse possession 
to acquire rights to those driveways148—a concern echoed by Attorney 
Ronald L. Baird.149 Surveyor Jim Colver expressed concern about the 
private roads, trails, and driveways that provide access to patents, 
fishing holes, cabins, and homes.150 Nevertheless, the only major 
changes made to Senate Bill 93 as introduced were to add exceptions 
dealing with good faith boundary disputes, acquisition of prescriptive 
 
 143.  3/11/03 Minutes, supra note 15 (statement of Russell Dick). It is likely that 
not all of Sealaska’s land was subject to adverse possession claims. Land 
conveyed by the federal government to a Native individual or corporation 
pursuant to the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act is exempt from adverse 
possession claims so long as it is undeveloped, not leased, and not sold. 43 
U.S.C. § 1636(d)(1)(A)(i) (2006). 
 144.  3/11/03 Minutes, supra note 15 (statement of Russell Dick). 
 145.  Id. (statement of Amy Seitz). Statutes generally bar adverse possession 
of government land. See supra note 35. 
 146.  3/11/03 Minutes, supra note 15 (statement of Pete Putzier). 
 147.  Id. (statements of Millie Martin and Shirley Schollenberg). 
 148.  4/16/03 Minutes, supra note 6 (statement of Tom Scarborough). 
 149.  Comm. Minutes on S.B. 93, ALASKA H. JUDICIARY STANDING COMM. 
MINUTES, 23rd Leg. (May 18, 2003) [hereinafter 5/18/03 Minutes I] (statement of 
Ronald L. Baird). 
 150.  5/18/03 Minutes II, supra note 14 (statement of Jim Colver). 
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easements by utilities, and state adverse possession of land for public 
transportation and access.151 
B.  The Changes to Sections 09.10.030 and 09.45.052 
Following the passage of Senate Bill 93 in 2003, section 09.10.030 of 
the Alaska Statutes was changed to read as follows: 
Sec. 09.10.030. Actions to recover real property in 10 years. 
(a) Except as provided in (b) of this section, a person may not bring 
an action for the recovery of real property or for the recovery of 
the possession of it unless the action is commenced within 10 
years. An action may not be maintained under this subsection for 
the recovery unless it appears that the plaintiff, an ancestor, a 
predecessor, or the grantor of the plaintiff was seized or 
possessed of the premises in question within 10 years before 
the commencement of the action. 
(b) An action may be brought at any time by a person who was seized 
or possessed of the real property in question at some time before the 
commencement of the action or whose grantor or predecessor was 
seized or possessed of the real property in question at some time before 
commencement of the action, and whose ownership interest in the real 
property is recorded under AS 40.17, in order to 
(1) quiet title to that real property; or 
(2) eject a person from that real property.152 
Section 09.10.030(b) applies to record owners whose ownership interests 
are properly recorded in the Department of Natural Resources 
recorder’s office in the recording district where the land is located.153 It is 
available to a record owner in an action against an adverse possessor so 
long as the record owner’s cause of action was not barred by section 
09.10.030(a) as it read before July 17, 2003.154 In other words, if the 
adverse possessor had possessed for ten years by July 17, 2003, then the 
record owner would have no recourse, since title would have 
automatically transferred to the adverse possessor at the end of the 
statutory period.155 However, if the adverse possessor hit the ten-year 
 
 151.  Compare S.B. 93, 23rd Leg. (as introduced, Feb. 28, 2003), with 2003 
Alaska Sess. Laws ch. 147. 
 152.  ALASKA STAT. § 09.10.030 (2010) (emphasis added). 
 153.  ALASKA STAT. §§  09.10.030(b), 40.17 (2010). 
 154.  2003 Alaska Sess. Laws ch. 147; see also Cowan v. Yeisley, 255 P.3d 966, 
973 (Alaska 2011) (holding the changes to section 09.10.030 are not 
retrospective). 
 155.  See Cowan, 255 P.3d at 974. 
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mark after July 17, 2003, then the record owner has a legal recourse 
against the adverse possessor. 
A record owner whose land is being claimed by an adverse 
possessor may sue at any time to quiet title to the property156 or to eject 
the adverse possessor from the property;157 it does not matter how long 
the adverse possessor has been there.158 Beyond recordation, the only 
requirement is that the record owner or her predecessor in interest must 
have been seized or possessed159 of the property at some point before the 
lawsuit is filed.160 So, suppose in the future Mary buys a piece of land in 
rural Alaska sight unseen, and she records her deed. One day she 
decides to visit, and she discovers that Fred and his family have built a 
cabin on the land and have been living there for the past fifty years. 
Assume that Fred did not possess for ten years prior to 2003. Because 
Mary owns a fee interest, she has been constructively “seized” of the 
land in question.161 Therefore, Mary can have a court kick Fred off the 
property. 
Section 09.45.052 provides the only exceptions under which an 
adverse possessor can acquire title to property good against the record 
owner and his successors.162 Senate Bill 93 changed section 09.45.052(a) 
as follows: 
Sec. 09.45.052. Adverse Possession. 
(a) The uninterrupted adverse notorious possession of real 
property under color and claim of title for seven years or more, 
or the uninterrupted adverse notorious possession of real property for 
10 years or more because of a good faith but mistaken belief that the 
real property lies within the boundaries of adjacent real property 
owned by the adverse claimant, is conclusively presumed to give 
 
 156.  Quiet title suits are filed under ALASKA STAT. § 09.45.010 (2010). 
 157.  Ejectment suits are filed under ALASKA STAT. § 09.45.630 (2010). 
 158.  Recently, the Alaska Supreme Court stated, “Although the pre-2003 [§ 
09.10.030 of the Alaska Statutes] purported only to bar a remedy, this court has 
stated that it can be the basis for a new title. The Legislature’s 2003 revisions 
essentially abolished the bar on the original landowner’s remedy and were 
intended to prevent adverse possession under this statute.” Cowan, 255 P.3d at 
973 n.23 (internal citations omitted). 
 159.  See discussion supra Part II.B.1. Presumably “seized or possessed” means 
the same thing in section 09.10.030(b) as it does in subsection (a). 
 160.  ALASKA STAT. § 09.10.030(b) (2010). 
 161.  See discussion supra notes 47–58 and accompanying text. 
 162.  See Cowan, 255 P.3d at 973 (“The net effect of [the 2003 revisions] was to 
limit Alaskans’ adverse possession claims to cases where the claimant had either 
color of title or a good faith but mistaken belief that the claimant owned the land 
in question.”). 
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title to the property except as against the state or the United 
States.163 
Section 09.45.052(a) still “conclusively” gives title to adverse possessors 
who have color of title and uninterruptedly, adversely, and notoriously 
possess property for at least seven years. In addition, section 09.45.052(a) 
now “conclusively” gives title to adverse possessors who have 
uninterruptedly, adversely, and notoriously possessed property 
adjacent to their own under a good faith but mistaken belief that it lies 
within the boundaries of their property.164 The same language that has 
applied to color of title cases throughout Alaska’s history now applies to 
good faith boundary-line mistakes. Consequently, once an adverse 
possessor has proven a good faith boundary mistake, for the reasons 
discussed in Part II.B.3, continuous, uninterrupted, and hostile are the 
only other elements the adverse possessor should have to prove in order 
to get title. 
Senate Bill 93 further amended section 09.45.052 by adding a new 
subsection allowing public utilities to acquire prescriptive easements.165 
With language similar to section 09.45.052(a), section 09.45.052(c) reads: 
“Notwithstanding [section 09.10.030 of the Alaska Statutes], the 
uninterrupted adverse notorious use of real property by a public utility 
for utility purposes for a period of 10 years or more vests in that utility 
an easement in that property for that purpose.”166 Although the word 
“conclusively” is not used, the listed elements are likely the only 
elements required, since exclusivity is the only other element employed 
by the Alaska Supreme Court,167 and it is not required to establish 
easements by prescription.168 
Finally, section 09.45.052 was amended to add a new subsection 
reading: 
(d) Notwithstanding [section 09.10.030 of the Alaska Statutes], 
the uninterrupted adverse notorious use, including 
construction, management, operation, or maintenance, of 
private land for public transportation or public access 
purposes, including highways, streets, roads, or trails, by the 
public, the state, or a political subdivision of the state, for a 
 
 163.  ALASKA STAT. § 09.45.052(a) (2010) (emphasis added). 
 164.  The most obvious example of such possession is when a landowner has 
long considered a fence to be located on the boundary of her property, but the 
actual boundary is a few feet inside the fence. 
 165.  ALASKA STAT. § 09.45.052(c) (2010). 
 166.  Id. 
 167.  See supra Part II.B.2. 
 168.  See supra note 125. 
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period of 10 years or more, vests an appropriate interest in that 
land in the state or a political subdivision of the state.169 
Section 09.45.052(d) gives the state a right to private land when the 
public or state has used it continuously, adversely, and notoriously for 
ten years or more for public transportation or access purposes. The word 
“use” seems to suggest that the state would acquire an easement. 
However, unlike section 09.45.052(c), section 09.45.052(d) does not 
mention easements; rather, it says that the state will acquire “an 
appropriate interest,” suggesting the state could acquire an interest 
greater than an easement. Regardless, section 09.45.052(d) provides state 
agencies, such as the Department of Transportation, the ability to 
acquire rights to roads. In addition, subsection (d) might also provide 
the public with the continued ability to acquire something akin to a 
public prescriptive easement. In a House Judiciary Committee meeting, 
Jon Tillinghast, legal counsel for Sealaska Corporation, stated that “the 
terms ‘trails’ and ‘public access purposes’ [in section 09.45.052(d)] were 
used to specifically preserve the rights of the state and municipalities to 
acquire access across private lands in order to reach public-use areas 
and public trails.”170 So, if members of the public used a trail on private 
land for “public access purposes,” such as accessing a public beach, and 
the use was continuous, hostile, and notorious, the state or a political 
subdivision of the state would acquire an interest in the land. In this 
case, there is no logical reason why the public would not have a 
continued right to use the trail. 
IV. SOME IMPLICATIONS OF THE REVISIONS 
A.  Prescriptive Easements and the Alaska Supreme Court’s Decision 
in Hansen v. Davis 
One of the biggest concerns left unaddressed as Senate Bill 93 
traveled through the Alaska Legislature was how it would affect private 
prescriptive easements.171 In 2009 the Alaska Supreme Court decided the 
prescriptive easement case of Hansen v. Davis.172 The Hansens and 
Davises lived on adjacent lots in Ketchikan.173 When the Davises bought 
their property in 1984, their grantor, Rodgers, reserved an easement 
across their lot. Rodgers never used the easement, and the Davises 
 
 169.  ALASKA STAT. § 09.45.052(d) (2010). 
 170.  See 5/18/03 Minutes II, supra note 14 (statement of Jon Tillinghast). 
 171.  See supra notes 146–150 and accompanying text. 
 172.  220 P.3d 911 (Alaska 2009). 
 173.  Id. at 913. 
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maintained a garden in the easement for many years.174 In 2006 the 
Hansens bought an adjacent lot, and in 2007 the Hansens purchased 
Rodgers’s easement.175 Then they disassembled the Davises’ gardening 
materials, built a road, and began installation of water and sewer 
lines.176 The Davises sued for trespass and damages.177 In their 
complaint, the Davises argued that their adverse use of the easement 
had extinguished it.178 The superior court ruled in favor of the Davises, 
and the Hansens appealed.179 
Prior to its decision in Hansen, the Alaska Supreme Court had not 
decided whether an easement could be extinguished by prescription.180 
The court stated that sections 09.10.030(a) and 09.45.052 of the Alaska 
Statutes govern the acquisition of real property rights via adverse 
possession and the creation of easements by prescription. However, it 
stated that the statutes do not address whether easements can be 
extinguished by prescription.181 
The Hansens argued that, in light of the 2003 amendments, 
extinguishing easements by prescription is contrary to the public policy 
of Alaska.182 The court disagreed. It stated: 
In amending the statutes governing adverse possession, the 
Alaska Legislature increased the burden that a litigant bears in 
proving adverse possession of another’s land. But it did not 
eliminate adverse possession and prescriptive easement claims 
altogether. We find no support for such a categorical rule 
allowing easement holders to seek redress for violations of 
their rights in an easement in perpetuity. Instead, we follow the 
approach adopted by . . . many jurisdictions and hold that an 
easement can be extinguished by prescription.183 
 
 174.  Id. 
 175.  Id. 
 176.  Id. at 913–14. 
 177.  Id. at 914. 
 178.  Id. 
 179.  Id. at 914–15. 
 180.  Id. at 915. 
 181.  Id. This statement is a bit puzzling, since section 09.10.030(a) no more 
explicitly speaks to title by adverse possession or the creation of easements by 
prescription than it does to the extinguishment of easements by prescription. 
Since the basis for the Davises’ claim that the Hansens’ easement had been 
extinguished and thus no longer burdened their land was the prescriptive 
period provided in section 09.10.030(a), it is not correct to consider Hansen as 
raising a purely common law issue. 
 182.  Hansen, 220 P.3d at 915. 
 183.  Id. at 915–16. 
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Nevertheless, the court ruled in favor of the Hansens.184 It noted 
that in contrast to a typical adverse possession or user claimant, the 
Davises, as owners of the servient estate, already had a right to use the 
area burdened by the easement.185 Consequently, the court held that in 
order to have crossed the line from permissive to hostile, the Davises’ 
use must have “unreasonably interfere[d] with the current or 
prospective use of the easement by the easement holder.”186 The court 
held that the burden on servient estate owners to prove unreasonable 
interference is high—a rule it considered consistent with the 2003 
amendments’ goal of curtailing but not abolishing adverse possession.187 
Applying its rule to the facts, the court held that the Davises’ 
construction of a garden was not “sufficiently adverse to commence the 
prescriptive period.”188 
Had the court considered the question in Hansen to be within the 
purview of section 09.10.030, the source of the prescriptive period, the 
court might have noticed that the pre-2003 version of section 09.10.030 
applied, since the alleged ten-plus years of adverse use by the Davises 
took place prior to 2003.189 An interesting question left unanswered by 
Hansen is what the result would be if the Davises established the 
elements necessary to extinguish the easement under the new statute. 
For example, suppose the Hansens record the deed granting them 
Rodgers’s easement, but they give up trying to use the easement. In 
2015, the Davises build a brick wall. Assume, arguendo, that the wall 
“unreasonably interferes” with the Hansens’ use of the easement. In 
2030, the Hansens decide they want to use the easement. The Hansens 
have never been “seized or possessed” of the easement, since one cannot 
be “seized or possessed” of an easement within the meaning of the 
statute.190 Therefore, they cannot sue under section 09.10.030(b) to quiet 
title to the easement. Consequently, although an owner of a servient 
estate must meet a high burden to prove an easement has been 
extinguished by prescription, the easement holder should not rely on 
section 09.10.030(b) to protect his interest. 
Another interesting question unanswered by Hansen is whether 
private easements can still be created by prescription. According to the 
language of section 09.10.030, practically speaking they cannot. Section 
 
 184.  Id. at 918. 
 185.  Id. at 916. 
 186.  Id. (internal citations omitted). 
 187.  Id. at 917. 
 188.  Id. 
 189.  See id at 913–14; supra notes 152–155 and accompanying text. 
 190.  See discussion supra Part II.B.1. 
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09.10.030(a) was unchanged by the 2003 amendments,191 and as noted by 
the court in Hansen, it is 09.10.030(a) that “constitutes a method for 
establishing an easement through prescription.”192 Therefore, according 
to section 09.10.030(a), a private prescriptive easement can still be 
created when a use is continuous, hostile, and open.193 However, section 
09.10.030(b) gives the record owner recourse against the prescriptive 
easement holder. The record owner’s recorded interest is not in the 
easement itself, since the easement did not exist prior to its creation by 
prescription. However, the record owner’s recorded interest is in the 
“real property in question.”194 If the record owner was “seized or 
possessed” of the property in question before the commencement of the 
lawsuit and her ownership interest is recorded, section 09.10.030(b) 
seems to provide that the record owner may sue at any time in order to 
quiet title to the property or eject the easement holder. 
It was almost certainly the goal of the legislature to curtail, if not 
abolish, private prescriptive easements.195 If the courts afford record 
owners the protections of section 09.10.030(b) where private easements 
are concerned, the ability to create easements by prescription will be 
drastically curtailed,196 which could result in users having to pay record 
owners for easement rights. However, it is worth noting that other 
means of creating easements, such as by implication197 or necessity,198 
 
 191.  Compare ALASKA STAT. § 09.10.030(a) (2010), with ALASKA STAT. § 
09.10.030 (2002). 
 192.  Hansen, 220 P.3d at 915 n.5. 
 193.  See supra note 124 and accompanying text. 
 194.  See ALASKA STAT. § 09.10.030(b) (2010). 
 195.  If the legislature thought that the creation of prescriptive easements 
would be unaffected by Senate Bill 93, then there would have been no reason to 
preface sections 09.45.052(c) and (d) of the Alaska Statutes—permitting public 
prescriptive easements—with “Notwithstanding [section 09.10.030 of the Alaska 
Statutes].” See ALASKA STAT. § 09.10.030(c), (d) (2010); accord 4/16/03 Minutes, 
supra note 6 (statement of Jon Tillinghast) (“[F]rom now on, if one wants to drive 
across another person’s property, the person will have to pay for it.”); 3/11/03 
Minutes, supra note 15 (statement of Amy Seitz) (stating a Legislative Legal and 
Research Services’ attorney believed prescriptive easements were included in 
the Senate Bill 93); see also supra notes 165–170 and accompanying text. 
 196.  A person could have color of title to an easement, in which case a 
permanent right to the easement could be acquired under section 09.52.045(a) of 
the Alaska Statutes. 
 197.  An implied easement arises when, at the time of a sale or conveyance of 
a portion of someone’s land, there is a quasi easement that is continuous, 
apparent, and reasonably necessary for the enjoyment of the land retained or 
conveyed. Williams v. Fagnani, 175 P.3d 38, 40 (Alaska 2007). 
 198.  An easement by necessity arises when a grantor conveys a portion of his 
land and that land is landlocked. In such a case, an access will be created across 
the grantor’s land, and it will exist for as long as the necessity continues. 
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are unaffected by the 2003 amendments and will apply to some 
landowners who need access to and from their land.  
B.     The Importance of Recording 
To be able to rely on section 09.10.030(b), the true owner of a piece 
of property must record his interest. Thus, the 2003 revisions to Alaska’s 
adverse possession statutes mean that property owners now have an 
additional reason to record, though neither section 09.10.030 or Alaska’s 
recording act impose any time constraints on when an owner must 
record.199 For example, suppose a true owner acquired his right to a 
piece of property via will, intestacy, or an adverse possession judicial 
decree issued under the old law. If he did not record his interest,200 
subsection (b) would not offer him any protections. This preference for 
recording makes some sense. One of the frequently cited purposes of 
adverse possession law is to clear titles to land and give third parties 
some assurance of who the owner of a piece of property is.201 If the “true 
owner” can oust an adverse possessor at any time, then it makes sense to 
require true owners to have a recorded interest so that third parties have 
a means of ascertaining who the true owner is. 
C. Good Faith Squatters 
The goal of the 2003 revisions was to eliminate “bad faith 
squatters” from having the ability to adversely possess land. In a Senate 
Judiciary meeting, Jon Tillinghast stated that Senate Bill 93 “only deals 
with bad faith adverse possession where a person has no written 
instrument whatsoever on which to base his claim.”202 In Mr. 
Tillinghast’s view, it seems that good faith adverse possession involves 
 
Freightways Terminal Co. v. Indus. & Commercial Constr., Inc., 381 P.2d 977, 
984 n. 16 (Alaska 1963). 
 199.  See ALASKA STAT. § 09.10.030(b) (2010). Nothing in section 09.10.030 
appears to prevent a record owner from recording his interest the day before 
commencing a lawsuit against an adverse possessor. See ALASKA STAT. § 
09.10.030(b) (2010). 
 200.  Nothing in Alaska’s recording act prevents property owners who took 
via will, intestacy, or some means other than a contract for sale from recording. 
See ALASKA STAT. § 40.17.010, § 40.17.110 (2010). However, those who take via 
will or intestacy often do not record. 
 201.  See, e.g., Alaska Nat’l Bank v. Linck, 559 P.2d 1049, 1054 (Alaska 1977) 
(stating that statutes of limitation and adverse possession law ensure that “title 
to land . . . not long be in doubt . . . and that third persons who come to regard 
the occupant as owner may be protected” (quoting Stoebuck, supra note 24, at 
53)). 
 202.  4/16/03 Minutes, supra note 6 (statement of Jon Tillinghast). 
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deeds: either the adverse possessor has a deed but makes a mistake 
about where a boundary line is located, or he has color of title.203 
However, the 2003 revisions left open the possibility that some good 
faith adverse possessors might have no legal recourse. For example, 
suppose Mary buys a piece of land in an undeveloped place. She goes 
onto the land she believes is described in the deed, builds a cabin, and 
lives there for thirty years. However, Mary misread the deed, which 
actually describes land two parcels over from the parcel on which Mary 
made her home. Mary acted in good faith, but she does not have color of 
title to the land on which she built her cabin.204 Mary also does not 
mistakenly believe that the property on which she is living lies within 
the bounds of adjacent property that she also owns. Consequently, the 
record owner can sue to have Mary ejected. 
CONCLUSION 
There is no strong evidence that there was a pressing need for the 
2003 amendments to Alaska’s adverse possession law because bad faith 
adverse possession was out of control. Nevertheless, in recent years 
many commentators have argued that adverse possession should be 
curtailed because many of the traditional purposes of adverse 
possession are now served by other areas of property law, and some 
states have taken steps to curtail it because of perceived inequities. In 
limiting the scope of its adverse possession law, Alaska could have 
adopted one of the approaches being tried by other states, such as 
imposing a good faith belief-in-ownership requirement205 or requiring 
that adverse possessors pay the property taxes.206 Alternatively, it might 
have tried one of the approaches suggested by legal scholars, such as 
exempting wild lands from adverse possession.207 Instead, Alaska 
elected to try an approach not tried by any other state. Alaska’s 2003 
amendments went further than any other state has gone in curtailing the 
application of adverse possession. Alaska is now serving as “a 
laboratory for the improvement of laws,” and over time, Alaska’s 
experience will likely illuminate whether there was some important 
 
 203.  See id. 
 204.  See Snook v. Bowers, 12 P.3d 771, 780 (Alaska 2000) (holding color of 
title requires that the writing describe the land being adversely claimed). 
 205.  Colorado and Oregon have such a requirement. See supra note 27. 
 206.  See, e.g., IDAHO CODE ANN. § 5-210 (West 2010). Jon Tillinghast of 
Sealaska suggested in a House Judiciary meeting that this option would not 
work for Alaska because much of the remote land in Alaska is not taxed. 5/18/03 
Minutes I, supra note 149 (statement of Jon Tillinghast). 
 207.  Sprankling, supra note 26, at 863. 
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purpose for the traditional adverse possession doctrine, or whether it 
truly should be a relic of the past. 
 
